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Abstract. The paper argues that pain is not a good counter-example to the 
privation theory of evil. objectors to the privation thesis see pain as too real 
to be accounted for in privative terms. However, the properties for which pain 
is intuitively thought of as real, i.e. its localised nature, intensity, and quality 
(prickly, throbbing, etc.) are features of the senso-somatic aspect of pain. This 
is a problem for the objectors because, as findings of modern science clearly 
demonstrate, the senso-somatic aspect of pain is neurologically and clinically 
separate from the emotional-psychological aspect of suffering. The intuition 
that what seems so real in pain is also the source of pain’s negative value thus 
falls apart. As far as the affective aspect of pain, i.e. ‘painfulness’ is concerned, 
it cannot refute the privation thesis either. For even if this is indeed the source 
of pain’s badness, the affective aspect is best accounted for in privative terms of 
loss and negation. The same holds for the effect of pain on the aching person.
INTroDuCTIoN
‘Just as there is no target set up for misses, so there is no nature of evil in 
the universe either’. (epictetus, Encheiridion 27)
Philosophers since Plato have been making a striking claim about 
evil: evil, they said, is essentially devoid of being, an absence of good. 
This seemingly absurd statement became the standard conclusion of 
rationalistic investigations into the ontology of evil. The difference 
between the theories lay mainly in the way they arrived at the conclusion 
that evil is privation, and in the metaphysical framework they worked 
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with; about the ontological last line they were unanimous: evil has no 
independent being.
The concept of evil as privation implies that like silence and darkness, 
evil does not have an independent content, or definition, or existence 
− for all this it is dependent on the good. but in difference with the 
‘absence of sound’ which is silence, and the ‘non presence of light’ which 
is darkness, ‘badness’ is a lack of what ought to be. It is, in other words, 
a privation of the normative. Such a view of evil is an inevitable result of 
the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics in which goodness is identified 
with being. but the privation thesis has also become a cornerstone in the 
philosophical engagement with the question of theodicy.
Very early on, we find Augustine using the idea of ‘evil as privation’ 
to conceptually isolate what we experience as evil from the idea of God, 
both as the Creator of all things and as the one who sustains them 
through constant affirmation. If evil is not a substance, it was not created, 
and the manichean urge to stipulate a competitive evil deity is nipped 
in the bud. but an instinctual objection immediately arises: if ‘being’ is 
identified with ‘goodness’, why do we keep on coming across what seem 
like clearly bad states of affairs? In his answer to the objectors Augustine 
develops what has become known as ‘the universality thesis’: every thing 
is good inasmuch as it has being, and bad to the extent to which it lacks 
being; in his words:
‘what is evil[?]… nothing else than corruption, either of the measure, 
or the form, or the order, that belong to nature. Nature therefore which 
has been corrupted, is called evil;… but even when corrupt, so far as it is 
nature it is good, so far as it is corrupted it is evil’.1
This paper does not offer a defence of the privation thesis. Instead, 
I propose to examine the objectors’ favourite concrete counter-example: 
pain. Isn’t it obvious, they ask, that pain is both evil and real? Conceptually, 
pain is situated in a unique crossroad between the discourses of natural 
science and morality, a fact which turns the ontological analysis into 
a particularly tricky business. but I shall argue that if we carefully analyse 
1 Augustine, ‘on the Nature of the Good’ in P. Schaff, ed. A Select Library of Nicene and 
post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: A New Series (oxford, buffalo: Parker & Co., 
The Christian literature company, 1886) chapter 17. For a modern Platonic concept of a 
supreme transcendent good, and the asymmetrical relationship between good and evil 
that it implies see r.m. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New 
York: oxford university Press, 1999), esp. pp. 102-4.
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the way in which pain is said to be bad in light of the findings of modern 
science, we will find that we can apply Augustine’s ‘universality thesis’ to 
it: in as much as pain is real it is not bad, and in as much as pain is bad it 
is best accounted for in privative terms of negation.
THe PrIVATIoN THeSIS
The relationship between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ can be depicted in one of 
three ways: contrast, negation, or privation. If the relationship is one 
of contrast, everything is either bad or good. Contrasting properties are 
distinguished from contrary properties X and Y, in that X and Y cannot 
be properties of the same item, but it is not the case that each item which 
can in principle be X or Y will indeed be either X or Y. Thus ‘being red all 
over’ and ‘being blue all over’ cannot be properties of the same item, but 
a coloured item need not be either blue or red; it can be yellow. If taken 
as contrasts, however, the properties ‘bad’ and ‘good’ are symmetrical 
and exhaustive; that is, in the relevant categories, items are either good 
or bad, [good] = [¬bad] and [¬good] = [bad].
If bad is a negation of good, this symmetry between the properties breaks 
down, as the good is not a negation of the bad. Here, badness is seen as 
a mere lack of goodness, parallel to the way in which darkness is defined 
as an absence of light. It is asymmetrical because light is not understood 
as a lack of darkness. As the example of darkness and light demonstrates, 
it is not the case that each object or state of affairs necessarily exhibits 
one of the two negating properties. but if [being illuminated] can in 
principle apply to an object, then either it or its negation must obtain 
(unlike asking whether my craving for ice cream is illuminated or dark, 
which is a categorical mistake). In difference to contrasts, though, 
[¬bad] ≠ [good], even though [bad] = [¬good].
As a result, if the relationship between good and evil are put in 
terms of privation, then the relationship between good and bad 
is a-symmetrical. The good has precedence over the bad, because bad is 
a mere privation of good. To say of a state of affairs that it is bad, is to 
say that something which ought to have been there is lacking. unlike 
silence or inactivity, badness is set against the normative; hence the 
relation is that of privation (rather than mere contrast or negation). 
Thus, anosmia is a privation of the sense of smell, and stupidity the 
absence of wisdom, but that is because, ideally, a person would possess 
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both wisdom and a sense of smell.2 From an ontological point of view 
the bad will therefore be accounted for as some shortage/loss/lack of 
good that ought to exist. From an epistemological point of view, it will 
be impossible to understand the bad before we know the good.
It has been argued by many that all the elaborate theoretical edifice of 
the privation thesis crumbles in the face of one all-familiar experience: 
pain. Indeed, when asked about the intuitive appeal of the metaphysics 
of  evil as privation, many would mention ‘pain’ as the first counter-
example that comes to mind.3 For there is something in the quality of 
pain that makes it look both obviously evil and undoubtedly real. The 
strong sense of reality most likely comes from the way in which pain is 
embedded in the body. Pain can be throbbing, prickling or burning; like 
a physical object, it has a location in the body, measurable intensity, and 
time  − all so different from the hole in the bagel.
A number of writers tried to tackle the challenge of pain by showing 
that it is a privation of a specific X: some suggest that X is ‘pleasure’, 
others that it is ‘well-being’, ‘health’ or ‘normal functioning’. None of 
these accounts is really satisfactory.4 but not all is lost for the privation 
theory. If pain is to prove that evil can be accounted for independently 
of the good, it must first be defined more clearly; and that is a surprisingly 
tricky task. Perhaps the simplest definition of pain would describe it as 
a ‘sensation that hurts’. This crude definition already reveals a baffling 
duality between a somatic aspect and a mental aspect of ‘how it feels’. 
recent findings on the way it is processed and experienced demonstrate 
that this duality in pain is far more complicated than in other sensations 
2 Here is how Aquinas puts it: ‘[e]vil imports the absence of good. but not every absence 
of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. 
Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not 
exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging 
to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, 
or the strength of a lion. but the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; 
as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness’ (T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 
(london: burns, oates, and Washbourne, 1912-36), I q.48, Argument 3, Answer).
3 See for example T. Calder, ‘Is the privation theory of evil dead?’, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2007), 371, p. 373.
4 As persuasively shown by Ibid., ‘The absence of pleasure, in itself, is not pain, 
although it may be the cause of pain’ (p.373) and G.S. Kane, ‘evil and Privation’, Int J 
Phil Rel, 11 (1980), 43, ‘pain seems clearly to be more than merely the absence of its 
contrary opposite… when pain occurs in the body, there is something new and different 
in a person’s experience which is not present when the body has simply lost feeling’ (p. 49). 
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such as taste and sight. This peculiar relationship between the sensational 
and the emotive aspects of pain must be taken into account when we try 
to establish the source of pain’s negative value. but once we have done 
that, we will see that the badness of pain is most successfully represented 
in negative terms of privation and loss.
THe SomATIC ASPeCT
let us start then with the somatic element. by now, neuroscientists are 
pretty clear about the neurophysiologic aspects of pain processing.5 
Some 100 years after it was offered by Head and Holmes, researchers still 
hold to the basic idea that our pain sensory system is comprised of two 
subsystems: one is the sensory discriminative system, which works out 
the noxious stimuli’s location, intensity, duration and kind (prickling, 
throbbing, burning etc.); the other is the ‘affective-motivational’ system 
which supports the unpleasantness aspect of the pain sensation.6
The two subsystems are served by different neurons (A-δ fibres, and C 
fibres respectively), with the effect that the sensory system transmits the 
first fast pain, and the affective system kicks in later and continues to 
fire even after the nerve endings are no longer stimulated. Although the 
A-δ fibres and C fibres pathways do interact (more than, say, the colour 
and distance pathways in the vision system), they eventually project into 
different areas in the brain: the fast pain information is processed by 
the somatosensory cortex which then produces data on the intensity, 
location and nature of pain, and the slow pain information arrives at the 
frontal lobe which handles the emotional reaction of hurt.7
The involvement of two quasi separate subsystems accounts for 
one of the most fascinating and baffling features of pain processing: 
the possibility of dissociation between the qualitative aspects of the 
experience (aching), and its quantitative ones (duration, intensity, etc.). 
We have, for example, a vast body of empirical datum which demonstrates 
how perception of the intensity of pain is in fact independent of its 
unpleasantness. Thus, patients who took morphine or suffered lesions to 
5 K. Sufka, ‘Sensations and Pain Processes’, Philosophical Psychology, 13 (2000), 299, p. 302. 
6 Ibid., p. 302.
7 The structure is of course much more complicated than this embarrassingly 
simplistic description. For a more detailed, but user-friendly description, see for example: 
S. Horn and m. munafò, Pain: Theory, Research, and Intervention (buckingham: Health 
Psychology, open university Press, 1997), chapter 2 and the sources cited there. 
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certain pain-processing areas in the brain can localise their pain, register 
its intensity and note its kind (probing, burning etc.), and all that without 
experiencing the slightest anguish.
more unfortunate are the Parkinson’s patients who can often feel the 
agony of pain without being able to localise it in their body.8 In a laboratory 
experiment, researchers managed to use hypnosis in order to change the 
subject’s perception of the obnoxiousness of hot water, without thereby 
changing the subject’s estimation of the intensity of the heat. PeT scans 
showed that such changes in the unpleasantness were accompanied by 
activity in the anterior cingulated cortex- the area that is responsible for 
the processing of the ‘painful’ feeling, while the other pain-processing 
areas remained quiet.9 With other sensations such division is hard even 
to conceptualise: it makes no sense to say that one perceives the tonal 
difference between different notes, and yet fails to experience the hearing 
of these notes. It is only with pain that a distinction between affect and 
sensation is possible.10
let us go back to the privation thesis. It seems that the embodiment 
of pain (e.g. its localised nature or the physical way in which we describe 
its qualities) is the main reason why it is immediately thought of as 
a bad aspect of the world which is too real to be defined in privative 
terms. but now we see that with pain the analytical distinction between 
the sensory-detecting component and the psychological-emotional 
component of hurting is not merely conceptual − it is wired into the 
experience itself. And the ‘realness’ of pain, i.e. its locality and intensity, 
is obviously anchored in the somatic aspect. This is a big problem for the 
intuition that pain is a powerful counter-example to the privation thesis. 
because as far as the somatic aspect is concerned, pain is a good thing, 
as its contribution to the ability to detect harm to body tissue is essential 
for the wellbeing of animals. Statistics shows that congenital or acquired 
8 See the sources cited in V. Grayhardcastle, ‘When pain is not’, The Journal of 
Philosophy 94 (1997), 381, pp. 392-3.
9 Pierre rainville, Gary H. Duncan, Donald D. Price, benoît Carrier, m. Catherine 
bushnell, ‘Pain Affect encoded in Human Anterior Cingulate but Not Somatosensory 
Cortex’, Science 277 (1997), pp. 968 - 971.
10 Note that this distinction is different from the distinction which philosophers make 
between ‘Qualia’ and sense data - what we called ‘quantitative’ aspects of pain comprise of 
both sense data and qualia; for example, the question whether a stimulus to nerve ends is 
prickling or burning can be answered from a purely objective point of view of the stimuli, 
but also from the subjective perspective of ‘how does it feel’.
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conditions which inhibit the sensation of pain (analgesia) are likely to 
shorten the patients’ lives.11 The sense of pain functions both as an alarm 
and as a powerful motivation to care for the body.12 It is therefore clear 
that the purely sensory element of pain cannot be the source of pain’s 
evil.13 In as much as it has any normative significance, it is intrinsically 
good. The negative value of pain must be rooted in a different aspect of 
the phenomenon.
THe AFFeCTIVe ASPeCT
If the somatic aspect of pain is axiologically neutral (or positive), the 
best candidate for being the source of pain’s negative value is the affective 
element, i.e. hurting or painfulness. Accounting for pain’s badness in 
this way largely waters down the power of the original intuition that 
prompted pain as a prime counter-example to the privation thesis. For 
hurt cannot be located in the brain in the same fashion as pain can be 
located in a finger. even the most ardent neuroscientists will be careful to 
stress that the great amount of data we have about the relation between 
(mainly cortical) activity in the brain and subjective unpleasantness still 
cannot prove that the psychological reaction to noxious stimuli can be 
reduced to the firing of neurons in the brain.14 At the most, one can argue 
that the feeling of suffering supervenes on the activity in the relevant 
brain areas. but still, isn’t the feeling of painfulness really there in your 
psyche?
11 even if such patients can be taught to pay careful attention to possible lesions on their 
skin, damage to internal body parts can be left unattended until it is too late. See for example 
John J. Haddad, ‘on the enigma of Pain and Hyperalgesia: A molecular Perspective’, 
Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications, 353 (2007), pp. 217-224. 
12 The way in which soldiers and athletes can sometimes function normally following 
a grievous injury without feeling any pain for a long time, does not show that we could 
do without pain; far from it. The reports on postponed pain reaction only attest to the 
sophistication of the pain mechanism. In times of extreme stress, when animals must 
fight or flee an enemy, they are better off if they can do so without the overwhelming 
effect of pain, even if that means that the damage to the limb is increased due to delayed 
care. When the injured eventually finds sanctuary, be it in the first-aid post or the 
showers, the sense of pain will kick in forcefully. Grayhardcastle, p. 407.
13 r. melzack, one of the fathers of the revolutionary ‘gate theory’ of pain, takes 
a  similar stance: ‘If… noxious input fails to evoke negative effect and aversive drive… 
the experience cannot be called pain.’ r. melzack, The Puzzle of Pain (New York: basic 
books, 1973).
14 K. Sufka, ‘Sensations and Pain Processes’, Philosophical Psychology, 13 (2000), 299, p. 307. 
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maybe. but the anti-privationists will also have to show why the 
badness of suffering does not lend itself to analysis in terms of privation. 
They will find it hard to do so. There are two main ways of analysing the 
normative significance of suffering, I will call them the ‘naturalist’ and 
the ‘Kantian’. Significantly, both are expounded by their proponent in 
basically negative terms. The naturalist maintains that pain has a very 
unique role in the axiological discourse, as it is the point where the 
natural and the normative unite. Thus, according to Nagel, ‘pains … 
provide at least agent-relative reasons for … avoidance, reasons that can 
be affirmed from an objective standpoint’.15 The normative meaning of 
pain lies in the way it can in itself give us a reason to stop it (by taking 
pain killers, act to release the PoW, make a donation to oxfam, etc.).
The Kantian must disagree: for her, the normative is always built 
on consciousness, and therefore pain, like any natural phenomena, 
cannot by itself be normative. being in pain means having a very strong 
inclination to put an end to the present state of affairs, and its normative 
significance lies in ‘your perception that you have a reason to change 
your condition’.16 The painfulness of pain is nature’s way of ensuring that 
we are strongly inclined to take care of ourselves, but it is the harm (to 
the self or to others) and not the painfulness which gives us a reason 
to act. In arguing that pain has a negative value because of the way we 
want to break away from the sensation, one is not at all committed to 
a subjective view of pain (i.e., to the view that the normative value of 
pain is in the mind and not in the world). As Korsgaard explains, the 
reasons which pain gives rise to are derived from our shared humanity, 
and therefore they apply to your pain as much as to mine.17
For our purposes, it is important to note how despite deep differences 
in respect to the function of pain in the axiological scheme, both the 
naturalist and the Kantian account for the evil of pain in privative terms: 
painfulness is conceived as a condition which one wants to put an end 
to, as a space to escape from, a sensation whose significance lies in its 
undesirability. It seems therefore that if pain is defined as a hurting bodily 
15 T. Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: oxford university Press, 1986), pp. 156-8. 
16 C.m. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1996), p. 146, therefore, pain which one does not want to avoid is not bad (p. 154); 
A. Swenson, ‘Pain’s evils’, Utilitas, 21 (2009), 197, p. 207.
17 See also e. Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New 
York: oxford university Press, 1985), who talks of pain as lacking a content of its own, 
a ‘sheer aversiveness’ (p. 52). 
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sensation the intuitive appeal of the counter-example is largely lost: the 
somatic aspect which makes it so irresistibly real cannot be the locus of 
pain’s badness, and the way in which the affective aspect confers negative 
value on pain is best accounted for in privative terms of breaking away 
and ending.
PAIN AS ACCeSS
but maybe the essence of pain can be described in a different way that 
more successfully grounds the original intuition about the realness of 
pain? In his masterful study of the ontology of evil, Adi ophir argues 
that pain is not an independent bodily sensation, but rather an overload 
of other sensations. Thus, he suggests that pain is ‘a sensation whose 
amplified presence overflows so as to make it unbearable, while the 
person who is present (to it) avoids, or is prevented from, discarding it’.18 
The definition alludes to the way in which sensations can turn into pain 
when they become excessive, i.e. over present. Thus, for example, too 
much touch can be experienced as a blow, harassment or ‘Chinese torture’. 
moreover, it is in the nature of these excesses that their presence to the 
sufferer is further augmented by her inability to make them disappear.19 
If pain is  indeed an excess of X (x=sensation), then it is essentially an 
overload of reality and the exact opposite of privation.
Alas, his innovative account of pain as over-presence of other sensations 
does not save ophir from slipping into the same trap as the more 
conventional definition. For his explanation of the badness of pain resorts 
to privative terminology of passivity and helplessness: ‘inability to get away 
from an overflowing sensation’ (6.000); ‘a desire to break off’ (6.030); In 
other places ophir offers an explicitly privative explanation of suffering as 
appearing as ‘the gap between the unbearable [i.e., the sensation] and the 
impossible [i.e., the act needed in order to make it tolerable]’ (6.400). It 
seems that when it comes to describing the badness of pain, the privation 
terms are unavoidable. Sensation in itself is axiologically neutral, and 
having more of it cannot change this. The essence of its transformation 
into value-laden phenomena, i.e., when pain becomes suffering, is best 
expressed in negative terms as the victim’s inability to end it.
18 A. ophir, Speaking Evil: Towards an Ontology of Morals (Tel-Aviv: Am oved & Van 
leer institute, 2000), Sec. 6.0.
19 Ibid. 6.010.
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but perhaps the account of pain’s badness as ‘inability to stop or 
escape it’ is not really a definition in negative terms? In his ‘Time and 
the other’ emanuel levinas argues that ‘[P]hysical suffering… in all its 
degrees entails the impossibility of detaching oneself from the instance 
of existence. It is the very irremissibility of being’.20 Pain is sui generis, 
he says, in that it is defined by the impossibility of fleeing or avoiding 
the situation, but in that it exemplifies the ‘impossibility of nothingness’ 
(p. 40). If what makes pain bad is the way you want it not to exist but 
cannot do so (for otherwise you wouldn’t be in pain), it is a negation of 
the possibility not to be ([pain] = ¬ ¬ [presence]).
Yet, the logic of the paradox here is flawed: [me wanting to end the 
state of pain] and [me not being able to do so] are two separate states 
that cannot negate each other, and my perceptions of these two states 
are also analytically separate. Think of a young child who has not yet 
developed an insight of himself as a person; he can still experience pain 
as something that he craves would stop, even while he cannot think of 
himself as being unable to stop it.
A similar view seems to underlie Jean Améry’s observation that 
‘nowhere else in the world did reality have as much effective power as in 
the camp, nowhere else was reality so real’.21 In the insightful and moving 
report of his experience in the Gestapo’s torture chambers, Améry claims 
that physical pain has an exceptional power to immerse the victim in 
reality: ‘Whoever is overcome by pain through torture experiences his 
body as never before. In self negation, his flesh becomes a total reality… 
the tortured person is only a body, and nothing besides that’ (p. 33). 
but if we look carefully at what Améry has in mind when he talks about 
‘reality’ here, we will see that he is using the term in a very different sense 
from that used by the privation thesis.
The question that interests Améry is not the metaphysics of being 
(Heidegger is mockingly referred to as ‘the magus from the Alemannic 
regions’), but rather the effect which extreme conditions of misery have 
over the intellect. He finds that the severe pain of torture, or the prolonged 
anguish of the inmates of concentration camps, have a devastating effect 
on the power of the intellect to raise us above mere physical existence: 
‘in no other place did the attempt to transcend it [i.e. reality] prove so 
20 e. lévinas and S. Hand, The Levinas Reader (oxford: blackwell, 1989), p. 39.
21 J. Améry, At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its 
Realities (bloomington: Indiana university Press, 1980), p. 19.
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hopeless and so shoddy’ (p. 19). The ‘reality’ he talks about is the physical, 
embodied existence to which the subject is locked by pain.
This is of course a much more limited sense of ‘reality’ than the 
abstract ‘being’ which the metaphysics of evil refers to. moreover, 
Améry’s depiction of the evil particular to excruciating pain is patently 
privative: the evil of extreme anguish, he says, lies in the way it prevents 
the sufferer from realising his humanity. like a horrific mirror image of 
his torturer, the victim is unable to elevate himself to the loftier forms 
of existence where his humanity can be expressed in full.22 And that 
takes us to another way in which pain can be thought to pose a serious 
problem for the privation theory, namely, its effect.
THe eFFeCT
A person, or a limb, in pain is dramatically different from its healthy form. 
When strong enough, pain can change the sufferer beyond recognition, 
as it takes hold of her entire body and soul. How can the driving force 
behind such a momentous change be devoid of being? In the background 
lurks a more general question about the nature of evil. In the opening 
question of his treatise On Evil Aquinas asks ‘whether evil is something’. 
The intuition that evil is indeed real is put in a straightforward manner in 
the first objection: ‘everything created is something. but evil is something 
created ... therefore evil is something’.23 evil, the objection goes on, even 
has its own proper activity – it corrupts. And corruption is a change, 
a movement from one state to another, a transformation that is as natural 
as creation. Can it be that such a potent agent is devoid of reality?
Yes, says Aquinas. He begins by drawing a basic distinction between 
the notions of ‘evil simply’ and ‘evil in some respect’. When we say of X 
that it is bad, what we really say is that some good aspect that pertains to 
it by its nature is missing. So ‘X is bad’ can mean ‘X is bad in some way’; 
what it cannot mean is ‘X is bad simpliciter’. The notion of evil simpliciter 
can never be an attribute of X because at the moment that X crosses the 
line from ‘having some bad aspects’ to ‘being wholly bad’ it disintegrates 
22 For a privative account of torture as a violation of the sacred see Adams, pp. 107-
114. A similar theme of the biblical transgression as a violation of the bond between God 
and man is identified by P. ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil (boston: beacon paperback 
Ariadne, beacon Press, 1969), pp. 50-54.
23 Aquinas Q1, A1, obj. 1.
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and ceases to be X.24 Thus, a bad washing machine can leave some stains 
on garments, fail to drain the water properly, leave clothes with too many 
creases, etc. but if the machine does not do any cleaning because it does 
not take in water, or has no receptacle for laundry or container for soap, 
it is not a ‘bad washing machine’; rather, it is not a washing machine at 
all. Sometimes we have a word for the item in the new stage, such as 
‘wreck’ or ‘corpse’, for example, but not always. either way, when the bad 
aspects of an item take over completely, it ceases to exist as that item. This 
works for pain as well. Taken simpliciter, say for the sake of laboratory 
experiment on pain killers, a good pain is that which is really hurting; 
rather more chilling examples would be the pains that the torturer or the 
sadist seek to induce − when pain is sought for its own sake, the more 
anguish the better.
but the reason why pain is seen as a potential counter example to the 
privation theory is not as per se but rather as relational to the limb or 
the body it is ‘in’. Can we say that as the agent of the change that is brought 
about on the aching body, a movement from one state to another, pain 
must be seen as an independent being? No, says Aquinas:
[T]hat which is evil, if it is evil simply, i.e. in itself, so corrupts or actively 
and effectively makes the thing corrupt not by acting but by dis-acting, 
i.e. by failing to act by reason of a deficiency of active power, as for 
example defective seed generates defectively and produces a monstrosity, 
which is a corruption of the natural order.25
If we look at what happens with Y which has gone through a process 
of corruption, we see that it is actually a loss of good states. ontologically, 
the change brought about by evil is akin to a ball rolling down the hill, in 
that there is no need for an active agent to push the ball. epistemologically, 
the change can only be understood on the background of the proper state 
24 In Augustine’s words: ‘No nature, therefore, as far as it is nature, is evil; but to 
each nature there is no evil except to be diminished in respect of good. but if by being 
diminished it should be consumed so that there is no good, no nature would be left.’ 
St. Augustine, ‘on the Nature of Good’ in P. Schaff, ed. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
(buffalo, NY: Christian literature Publishing Co., 1887), chapter 17. 
25 Q1, A1, rep. 8. For the way his ontology of privation informs his analysis of moral 
wrongdoing and vice see J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The 
Case of Thomas Aquinas (bd. 52, brill, leiden: Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte 
des mittelalters, 1996), pp. 319-34, and N. Kretzman and e. Stump, ‘being and Goodness’ 
in S. macDonald, ed. Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and 
Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1991), pp. 103-6.
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of the affected Y. As the change consists only of a loss of this proprietary, 
and has no independent content.
We tend indeed to talk about an X (say risky mortgage practices), as 
‘bad’ when it induces a process of deterioration in another entity (the 
credit market). but the corruption itself always comes down to a failure 
to act or function well. An under-regulated market gradually ceases to 
function according to its proper action, and the process is best described 
as a (gradual or acute) diminution in the goods which it purportedly 
holds for the players. And this process cannot be accounted for without 
relying on the goods which a fully-functioning free market is supposed 
to produce.
The same holds for pain. If we try to analyse physical pain from the 
point of view of the effect it has over the victim, we see that far from 
being a counterexample to the privation thesis, it is actually a powerful 
expression of the rationalist tenets on which the thesis is based. This is 
because what is lost to those in severe pain is the logos. In her masterful 
‘The body in Pain’, elaine Scarry offers a deep and systematic study of the 
way in which torture works to extinguish the building blocks of rational 
thought . much of what she writes about the effects of manmade pain on 
the psyche is applicable to natural pain as well.
‘Physical pain always mimes death’ says Scarry (p. 31). For pain turns 
the sufferer’s attention to an ever existing possibility for ending it: death. 
Death has a way of ‘announcing itself in suffering’, and thus foreshadow 
the ultimate extinction of knowledge and experience.26 but in contrast 
with the total negation which is death, pain implies two specific losses: 
that of the unity between body and psyche, and that of words.
Pain dismantles the unity between body and soul when the body of 
the sufferer becomes the tool with which extreme anguish is brought 
about. The horrific experience of one’s own body turning into an enemy 
is exceptionally salient in torture. but people with very painful illness also 
feel a sharp sense of betrayal on the part of their body. This is an effect 
that is unique to pain, but it is best described in terms of destruction and 
loss. And so, the evil of pain can only be understood on a background 
of the good – the integrity of body and soul – of which it is a privation.
A different, and perhaps deeper loss wrought by pain is that of the 
logos. Great physical pain tends to efface the content of consciousness. 
26 See also lévinas and Hand, p. 40. See also Améry on ‘the equation body = Pain = 
Death’ (p. 34). 
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In the depth of misery, physical pain erases all the subjects of human 
cognizance, leaving only the consciousness of the aching body: ‘Frail in 
the face of violence, yelling out in pain, awaiting no help… the tortured 
person is only a body, and nothing else besides that.’27 The destruction 
of consciousness wrecked by pain is most powerfully manifested in the 
gradual annihilation of language. First, pain becomes the dominant 
subject of language, as complaint takes over other forms of speech. but 
then (or if the pain is overwhelming, right at the start) coherent sentences 
and words give way to pre-lingual groans and cries.
Pain itself is stubbornly resistant to verbal expression,28 and when it 
takes hold of the entire space of consciousness it drives language away 
and the sufferer regresses to a pre-lingual stage. As language collapses 
under the immense pressure of pain so does the entire complex content of 
the mature psyche. When the victim ‘sees stars’ she cannot see her loved 
ones, the political ideals in which she believed, the places she belongs to 
or the personal history that gives meaning and context to her life.29 From 
the point of view of its effects pain is therefore a powerful expression of 
the privation thesis, as it comes down to a loss of reason and humanity.
CoNCluSIoN
This paper set out to explore the hunch that pain is an ‘evil in the flesh’ and 
is therefore a ‘real bad’ that refutes the privation analysis of evil. It turns 
out that this intuition cannot survive a conceptual analysis that takes into 
account the findings of modern science. For these show us that the two 
components of the phenomenon of pain, the somatic and the affective, 
are separate not only analytically but also physically and psychologically. 
And so, while the anguish of pain is indeed generally thought to be bad, 
those features of pain that make people think that it is too real to be 
privative are rooted in the bodily sensation of pain. but pain as a bodily 
sensation is not bad at all, it is essential for the proper functioning of the 
27 Améry, p. 33; see also Korsgaard, p. 153, and Swenson, p. 208.
28 As Virginia Woolf noted: ‘english which can express the thoughts of Hamlet and 
the tragedy of lear has no words for the shiver or the headache.’ V. Woolf, On Being Ill 
(Ashfield, mass.: Paris Press, 2002).
29 This is why the ‘betrayal’ under torture is nothing of the kind – one cannot betray 
what one cannot possibly feel loyal to. The purpose of the interrogation that always 
accompanies torture is first and foremost the affirmation of the world-destroying effect 
of pain, and thus of the absolute power of the regime (Scarry, pp. 29-38).
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creature in which it occurs. The realness of pain and its negative value 
thus belong with different independent aspects of it.
The objectors are left with two other aspects of pain that can potentially 
refute the privation thesis: the condition of suffering, and pain’s effect on 
the painful body and limb. but even if the badness of these aspects of 
pain is left undisputed, both these aspects are best described in negative 
terms of avoidance and lack: painfulness is a condition you want to 
put an end to, run away from, stop. The effects of pain are similarly 
rendered in privative terms, as a change that is essentially a destruction: 
of the body-soul integrity, and of the consciousness of anything besides 
the pain. looked at from that angle, pain is actually a good example an 
analysis of evil in terms of privation. For as argued by Augustine, what 
is real in pain, i.e. its embodiment, is not the source of its negative value, 
and what is bad in pain is best understood as escape, loss and lack.30
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